



The 1960 Un Conference on the Law of the Sea failed to reach agreement on the breadth of the 
territorial sea and fishing limits, with India, Chile and Ecuador playing decisive roles 
This article is by Kirsten Sellars (kirsten.
sellars@anu.edu.au), visiting fellow at the 
Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, 
Australian National University, Australia
The road to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was littered with failed 
treaty-making conferences. In 1930, a 
League of Nations conference broke 
up without a decision over territorial 
waters. In 1958, a UN conference failed 
to agree on the breadth of the territorial 
sea and associated fishing limits. In 
1960, a follow-up UN conference to 
decide these two outstanding questions 
collapsed. 
At the 1960 conference, a joint 
United States-Canada plan emerged as 
the front-runner, calling for a universal 
six-nautical-mile territorial sea plus 
a non-exclusive six-mile fishing zone, 
with a 10-year phase-out of ‘historic 
fishing rights’ for states fishing in 
other state’s waters over the previous 
five years. This plan, backed by the 
maritime powers—who sought to 
maximize their own naval, merchant 
and fishing fleets’ global reach by 
minimizing others’ claims to territorial 
seas and fishing zones—also won the 
support of the West European nations, 
the former British dominions, and 
moderates elsewhere. But could it gain 
the required two-thirds of the vote? 
At the time, Asia-pacific states 
played a pivotal role in the coastal 
states’ campaign for greater control 
over their coastal waters. Many from 
the region questioned the universalist 
claims made on behalf of the law of 
the sea and found them to be wanting. 
Indeed, Indian ministers challenged 
the idea that the law of the sea 
was international law at all. 
In the run-up to the conference, 
Defence Minister Krishna Menon noted 
that the maritime powers’ claims to 
‘historic fishing rights’ in other states’ 
coastal waters simply perpetuated the 
exploitative practices of colonialism. 
And Law Minister, Ashoke Sen, and 
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others observed that the powers 
habitually treated the high seas as 
private property, closing off swathes 
of ocean when it suited them. They 
cited the example of the Americans 
declaring danger zones in the pacific 
for the Bikini Atoll nuclear tests and 
the Eastern Mediterranean during the 
Syria-Turkey crisis. 
At the conference, the Asia-pacific 
states pursued a dual strategy when 
agitating for greater control over 
their own coastal waters. The Indian 
delegation argued that coastal states 
should be empowered to control the 
movement of foreign warships through 
the territorial sea and the contiguous 
zone, while delegations from the 
pacific-seaboard Latin American states 
pressed for recognition of exclusive 
fishing zones and preferential fishing 
rights in the high seas. Together, 
these campaigns offered a compelling 
alternative to the minimal package 
offered by the US-Canada plan. 
territorial sea
Ashoke Sen, leading the Indian 
delegation, pushed Western 
delegations to accept an amendment 
that required the authorization of 
warships in the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone. He stressed that he 
was under strict instructions from prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to extract 
concessions on this issue. The Western 
delegates cobbled together a counter-
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but not prior authorization, of 
warships. Nehru’s Cabinet turned this 
down. The Americans were concerned 
by this, and one State Department 
official, speaking to the Canadian 
ambassador in Washington, wondered 
whether it might be necessary to bring 
‘strong pressure’ to bear on India. (The 
Canadian responded that ‘strong-arm 
tactics’ would likely stiffen the Indian 
resolve.) 
Meanwhile, a different kind of 
pressure was applied, with president 
Dwight Eisenhower and two prime 
ministers, John Diefenbaker and 
Harold Macmillan, sending personal 
messages to Nehru to persuade him 
to drop the idea of authorization 
and support the US-Canada plan. 
Macmillan informed him that India’s 
attitude would be “highly important 
for the success or failure of the 
Conference”, and that its breakdown 
would prompt unilateral action that 
“could give rise to dangerous friction”. 
yet he offered nothing more than that 
which had already been rejected by 
India—namely, prior notification but 
not prior authorization. A few days 
later, Nehru sent an equally unyielding 
reply back to Macmillan: “As you know, 
there is conflict of opinion between 
some of the great maritime powers and 
the smaller countries who, from past 
experience, are rather apprehensive 
of any interference with their freedom 
and independence. In regard to one 
matter particularly there has been 
strong feeling among those countries 
which, I feel, is justified. This is in 
regard to foreign warships coming 
within coastal waters without prior 
authorization. We have given a great 
deal of thought to this matter and we 
feel that the proper course would be 
for such authority or permission to be 
obtained from the coast State. Even 
normal courtesy would demand this.” 
The plan’s sponsors had played 
their final card and had been 
unceremoniously rebuked. There 
was no middle ground on authorization 
of the passage of warships: if the West 
did not give way, the Indian delegation 
would vote against the US-Canada 
plan. This threatened to damage the 
prospects of the conference reaching a 
decision.
fishing rights
While India was holding out against 
the West over warships, other states 
were chipping away at the ‘historic 
fishing rights’ component of the US-
Canada plan. For many delegates, the 
unregulated presence of other states’ 
long-distance fishing fleets in their 
offshore waters was unacceptable. 
While Iceland’s clashes with British 
trawlers under Royal Navy protection 
dominated the headlines in the 
Northern hemisphere, the Asia-pacific 
states pushed back too. In the mid-
1950s, for example, the peruvians 
impounded Onassis fleet whalers and 
US tuna clippers operating within 200 
miles of their coastline. And the South 
Koreans arrested, and occasionally 
destroyed, Japanese trawlers and 
trollers that ventured across the 190-
mile ‘Rhee Line’. 
As the conference progressed, the 
opposition to the US-Canada plan 
gathered pace, prompting the plan’s 
sponsors to offer sweeteners to coastal 
states concerned about foreign fishing. 
The US and Canadian delegations 
drafted an amendment to their own 
plan—submitted by Brazil, Cuba and 
Uruguay—offering states limited 
preferential fishing rights in the high 
seas, subject to compulsory dispute 
settlement. And the US delegation 
leader, Arthur Dean, offered some 
South and Central American states 
one-on-one deals that would cancel 
American claims to historic fishing 
rights in their coastal waters in 
exchange for votes supporting—or at 
least abstaining on—the US-Canada 
plan. After fixing these deals, Dean 
expected Ecuador and El Salvador to 
abstain, and Argentina, Guatemala and 
Chile to vote for the plan. This would 
have been just enough to secure the 
two-thirds majority required for treaty 
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signature. But there’s many a slip ’twixt 
the cup and the lip – and slip things did. 
In the final hours before the voting 
in plenary was due to take place, the 
Chilean and Ecuadoran governments 
instructed their delegates to vote 
against the US-Canada plan. Then there 
was another twist. The Brazil-Cuba-
Uruguay amendment sailed through 
the plenary with a comfortable two-
thirds majority, but opposition to it had 
been brewing in Japan, home to one of 
the world’s largest long-distance fishing 
fleets, on grounds of both preferential 
fishing rights and compulsory dispute 
settlement. As a consequence, Tokyo 
instructed its delegation to abstain 
rather than vote for the US-Canada 
plan if amended by the Brazil-Cuba-
Uruguay proposal. 
In the event, the US-Canada plan 
secured 54 votes for, 28 against, with 
five abstentions; Lebanon was absent 
from the chamber. It, therefore failed 
by a single vote to win a two-thirds 
majority, and the conference collapsed. 
In the following days, the Western 
delegation leaders cabled their 
capitals, laying most of the blame for 
the outcome on three states: India, 
Chile and Ecuador. The New Zealand 
delegation leader Robert Quentin-
Baxter summed up the factors that had 
led to the breakdown. India, he wrote, 
was the biggest contributor because its 
opposition to the US-Canada plan “gave 
heart” to those campaigning for wider 
territorial seas, encouraging some to 
shift their positions, and emboldening 
others to hold out for better deals. 
And the Americans’ concessions 
had not prevented Chile’s move from 
support to opposition, or Ecuador from 
pressing “new private demands against 
United States to which latter could 
not agree”, prompting its switch from 
abstention to opposition. Meanwhile, 
Japan, reacting against the offer of 
preferential fishing rights, shifted from 
support to abstention. All told, these 
developments were enough to deny the 
maritime powers their treaty. 
Confidence crisis
The Western states saw the failure of 
the 1960 conference as a significant 
problem. Indeed, it triggered a crisis 
of confidence in the practice of treaty-
making itself. If they were unable to 
command sufficient votes for their 
positions on the law of the sea, how 
could they ensure that their interests 
were represented in other general 
multilateral treaties? At the next UN 
conference on the law of the sea of 1973-
82, they therefore attempted to reassert 
their control over the process by 
persuading the conference to move away 
from voting, and towards agreement by 
consensus and an all-in package deal. 
In the event, the US-Canada plan failed by a single vote to 
win a two-thirds majority. The conference collapsed. 
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